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Abstract 
 
 One of the notable characteristics of modern financial markets is the 
convergence among financial institutions, which until recently preformed 
different tasks.  To this end, the present study explores the bank-insurance 
phenomenon in the Greek market.  It focuses on the development of financial 
conglomerates in the region, while arguing that the phenomenon is not as new as 
one would expect.  A variant of the bank-insurance approach to financial services 
seems to have dominated the Greek market for over a century.  An analysis of 
recent developments is also presented, with the evidence indicating a trend 
towards multi-venture partnerships as well as active involvement of multinational 
enterprises. 
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I.   Introduction 
 
 Over the last two decades one of the trends that changed the services 
banks and insurance companies traditionally offer, is the bank-insurance 
phenomenon3.  The phenomenon could be placed under the wider umbrella of 
mergers, acquisitions and corporate restructuring (Sudarsanam, 1995).  While the 
bank becomes the majority partner in a bancassurance venture, the roles are 
reversed in an assurbanking operation.  The extent to which these corporate 
structures are and will be taking place is a function of three main forces: changing 
economic environment, customer preferences and deregulation.  One of the cliché 
phrases, espoused by market professionals, for the development of those ventures 
is the reduction of the diseconomies of scope.  Financial synergies4 remain the 
background justification for every restructuring with the word being used to the 
point of exhaustion.  Van den Berghe & Verweire (2001) explore various aspects 
of bank-insurance and discriminate between the financial and institutional aspects 
of convergence; while Merton (1994) discusses the problem in view of a 
functional approach to finance and insurance and provides clues to understanding 
the trend as natural.   
The objective of the paper is to get some insight into the bank-insurance 
trend in Greece.  The particular market is of distinct interest for three main 
reasons.  Firstly, the Greek market is the most developed in Balkans, has shown 
considerable economic growth rate improvement and has been characterised by 
extensive fiscal and social reforms over the last two decades5 (Staikouras & 
Dickinson, 2005).  The interest in the region is also triggered by the rapid 
expansion of the European Union (EU) and the development of bank-insurance in 
the region, as opposed to its slow advent in the UK and the US.  Secondly, the 
literature in the Greek bank-insurance market is nonexistent.  There is not, at least 
to our knowledge, any comprehensive study that puts together the activities in this 
particular market.  Academics and practitioners argue that the phenomenon could 
improve the competence of financial institutions, but reinforce the lack of 
research in this particular area; while the debate still remains an open issue with 
clearly established arguments (Saunders, 1994, 1999, 2004).  Last but not least, 
the interface between banks and insurers, in Greece, is not as new as one might 
expect; but it seemed to have existed, in variants of its strict definition, even 
before its de jure implementation. 
                                                          
3 The term first appeared in France as bancassurance, in the 1980s, while variants of it are also 
known as Assurbanking and Allfinanz.  The latter mirrors the activities of financial conglomerates 
and universal banks.  Financial conglomerates are financial institutions that provide a wide range 
of financial products and services, while universal banks are holding companies that have 
integrated non-financial firms in their corporate structure. 
4 For a thorough examination of the cost and profit efficiency in the European bank-insurance 
market, the interested reader is referred to Vander Vennet (2002).  For a risk-return analysis, see 
Nurullah & Staikouras (2008). 
5 The interested reader is referred to the ESI (Economic Sentiment Indicator) of the European 
Commission and the LEI (Leading Economic Indicator) by the OECD.  A more detailed analysis 
of economic indicators and the recent developments in the Greek economy is available from the 
author upon request. 
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In what follows, Section II provides a brief discussion of the developments 
in the Greek market.  Section III, examines the roots of the bank-insurance 
venture and its progression to the current form; while Section IV concludes the 
analysis and looks at the possible extensions of the present study. 
 
II.   The Transition Phase of the Greek Economy 
 
 Despite the fact that the Greek financial services industry has its roots at 
the beginning of the last century, it is only the last decades that the market has 
witnessed the birth of financial conglomerates.  As a result, historical and 
regulatory differences among financial intermediaries have to be revisited to 
better reflect the needs and preferences of modern financial markets, while public 
policy issues need to be considered as well (Herring & Santomero, 1989, 1990).  
Thus, managers should be able to evaluate alternative organizational structures 
not only because of regulatory benefits, but also of financial performance and 
operational efficiency.  Kazantzis (2000) provides a discussion and critically 
reviews the financial sector, discusses the possible interface among financial 
services and points out the need for product differentiation and target 
diversification. 
 Examining the structure of the Greek financial market inevitably entails a 
time series examination.  There are two distinctive phases, in broad terms, which 
are important in understanding the economic and regulatory changes in the region.  
The cut-off year is 1981, when Greece joined the EU.  Prior to 1981, the 
economic policy engulfed a plethora of administrative constraints covering, 
among others, the pricing, volume and allocation of financial resources of the 
economy.  Government intervention, restrictive monetary policy and limited 
credit flexibility were the main characteristics of the domestic market.  This had a 
direct impact on the structure of the economy, which was overregulated with an 
inflexible and complex institutional framework. 
Upon joining the EU, one witnesses the beginning of the financial 
system’s gradual reform.  The early 1980s is a transition period paving the way 
for an open market economy and institutional changes.  Towards the end of the 
decade the harmonisation of financial institutions with the EU Directives, 
rationalisation of financial markets and relaxation of restrictions upon credit 
policy is evident.  With the advent of 1990s, the market is restructured while full 
liberalisation of capital movements and internalisation of European laws are 
already in place.  It is at this stage where the first domestic laws surface to allow 
cross-sector interface.  Finally, efforts to join the single currency market, along 
with declining inflation and economic growth are fuelling an upsurge of foreign 
investment in the region. 
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III.   The Greek Bank-Insurance Model 
 
 A number of financial and structural reforms have taken place and the 
efforts of the state to turn its economic situation around have paid off.  Financial 
conglomerates, sectors’ interface, asset-liability and risk management, as well as 
many other terms have become the norm.  For decades, the prevailing legal 
framework (A.54 – L.400/70)6 governing banks and insurance firms openly 
precluded any involvement of credit institutions in selling insurance products.  It 
is believed that until the modernisation of the banking system, the only field in 
which credit institutions could compete was the number of branches that each 
bank had.  The banks were essentially choosing their customers, since the latter 
had no real choice as far as prices (interest) are concerned.  The modernisation of 
the insurance sector came in effect with the change in law (A.183 – L.1569/85), in 
the mid 1980s, which simplified the insurance intermediation process.  Then, in 
the early 1990s (A.16 – L.2076/92) banks were allowed to actively participate in 
one or more insurance firms.  The deregulation and harmonisation process 
continued until the late 1990s (A.10 – L.2170/93, L.2166/93, A.186 – PD252/96, 
A.87 – L.2496/97), where the interaction between banks and insurers as well as 
the presence of leading multinational firms became more evident. 
 Currently, the estimated market share of the bank-insurance model is 
approximately 6 percent.  Unfortunately, Greek insurance firms are not legally 
obliged to disclose any statistical information per distribution network, hence the 
aforesaid estimated figure.  It is also worth noting that any information for the 
present research is manually collected from press reports, industry newsletters, 
annual reports and company accounts.  Furthermore, a number of individuals were 
contacted in order to provide us with further insight into the bank-insurance 
phenomenon in the region7.  Examining the most active and prominent banks in 
the Greek market a number of hybrid corporate structures emerge.  The sample 
consists of 11 banks actively involved in the domestic and foreign banking 
industry.  The following illustration depicts the market-based bank-insurance 
ventures encountered in the Greek market.  The smaller pie-chart shows the 
number of banks engaging in more than one link-up with other insurance firms.  
That is, despite the fact that a bank may have an insurance subsidiary or alliance 
with another firm, the bank forms an alliance with another insurer(s) as well.  The 
alliances involve both domestic and foreign firms operating in the Greek market.  
Dickinson (1993, 1996) examines the evolution of the global insurance market, 
foresees the changing structure of the financial services industry and discusses the 
single European insurance market as well as the importance of cross-border take-
overs and joint ventures. 
 
                                                          
6 The abbreviations A and L stand for article and law respectively, while the number after the 
forward slash indicates the year the law was introduced.  Where appropriate, L is replaced by PD 
indicating Presidential Decree. 
7 The author is indebted to Michel Zanatta - Managing Director Emboriki Life and Nikolaos 
Violakis - Manager Alpha Insurance for providing their valuable comments and statistical figures. 
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Subsidiary Model
7 Banks
Alliance Model
6 Banks
Joint Venture
2 Banks
Two Link-ups
2 Banks
Three Link-ups
1 Bank
No Multi-Venture
8 Banks
Illustration 1: Bank-insurance structures and Multi-venture analysis. 
 
 
 
  
 The main partnership between the banking and insurance sectors is 
observed through the subsidiary mode.  That is, the bank establishes an insurance 
subsidiary which in many cases works in parallel with an existing insurance 
agency attached to the bank.  The bank branches operate as a source of insurance 
awareness and promotion of insurance-related products.  The other interesting 
structure is the formation of alliance partners with domestic firms and/or foreign 
multinationals.  Global strategic alliances are the possible viable alternatives to 
merging, acquiring and/or creating new business entities.  Allianz, Generali and 
Alico-AIG Life are a few of those who actively operate in the Greek market.  
Strategic alliances are not capital intensive investments, but require careful 
planning and coordination.  Such mode of cooperation is usually seen as a fertile 
territory for industry product expansion and for exploiting a market niche via 
superior competitiveness (Dyer & Singh, 1998).  On the other hand, unless there 
is a truly committed partnership, these alliances usually suffer from instability, 
premature dissolution and underperformance (Parkhe, 1993).  The third mode of 
interface involves the presence of multinational firms, with wide experience in the 
insurance arena, aiming to create joint ventures with local banks.  The latter will 
provide their customer base, expertise in the domestic market and an established 
brand name.  Such ventures emerged in the Greek market in 2002, when ING and 
Predica joined forces with Piraeus and Emporiki Bank respectively.  This kind of 
cooperation is capital intensive and requires thorough financial analysis and 
strategic planning. 
Nonetheless, the aforesaid cross-industry collaborations do not appear as 
single business deals.  Increased global competition, the threat of takeovers and 
the shareholders’ pressure for superior returns has forced enterprises to focus on 
maximizing their corporate value.  Thus, in many cases, financial intermediaries 
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experience various forms of corporate structure running in parallel with existing 
and/or potential business agreements of a different nature.  The second and 
smaller pie-chart portrays such multi-venture analysis.  It is clear that 27% of the 
bank-insurance network is targeting multi-venture agreements, possibly aiming at 
catching a bigger market share and/or increase their competitiveness in the 
domestic market.  It is also worth mentioning, that multiple co-operations could 
easily aim at diversifying a number of risks, which are not purely financial8.  
These could be losses related to the effectiveness of collaboration, suitability of 
the products, market share, cultural and management integration, pre-sales service 
such as risk assessment and product tailoring, post-sales service related to loss 
assessment and prompt settlement of claims, and last but not least reputation 
costs.  The majority of these collaborations take place in the mixed insurance 
arena followed by life and general (non-life) insurers.  Nonetheless, there is no 
standard bank-insurance model, since the structure is, or should be, the result of a 
strategic decision making process. 
The phenomenon becomes even more intriguing, however, when one 
looks at the history of the previously stated-owned banks.  As it is mentioned 
earlier, in section II, prior to 1981 the Greek economy was characterised by heavy 
government intervention.  The state banks possessed insurance subsidiaries, but 
without the banks being allowed to sell insurance services.  The “traditional” 
subsidiary model goes back to 1891 when the National Bank of Greece 
established its subsidiary insurance firm – Ethniki Insurance.  Obviously the 
banking and insurance sector went through various phases since then.  During the 
last century, a number of banks established/bought their own insurance 
subsidiaries.  This process continued and one could easily argue that these banks 
started shaping the first element of the current practice even before the de jure 
implementation of the bank-insurance interface.  To make the analysis even more 
interesting, it is those banks that made their customers aware of the various 
insurance products available to accompany their investment decisions.  It was 
actually, at the time, a de facto policy to ask the bank’s customer to purchase any 
pertinent insurance from the bank’s subsidiary.  The sale of a banking host 
product, such as a mortgage or a loan, and its indirect link with a fire or credit life 
insurance being attached to it, is usually known as “conditional selling”.  It is, 
therefore, obvious that a different form of the current bank-insurance model used 
to exist in the Greek market for many years, raising awareness of the insurance 
industry through the banking sector9.  A diagrammatic illustration of the historical 
bank-insurance expansion is provided in the appendix at the end of the paper. 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 For a non-quantitative analysis of the risks and benefits of the bank-insurance phenomenon, the 
interested reader is referred to Staikouras (2006). 
9 For a detailed analysis of the various forms of bank-insurance, and discussion of market-based 
ventures in Greece, the interested reader is referred to Artikis, Mutenga & Staikouras (2008b), 
Kalotychou & Staikouras (2007).  A general discussion about the bank-insurance arena is 
provided in Artikis, Mutenga & Staikouras (2008a). 
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Illustration 2: Evolution of the Greek Bank-Insurance Phenomenon. 
 
STAGE  I 
1881 – 1980 
 STAGE  II 
1981 – 1991 
STAGE  III 
1992 – 1996 
STAGE  IV 
1997 – To date 
      
Interaction 
between sectors 
is not permitted.  
State banks, 
however, 
possess 
insurance 
subsidiaries. 
 Greece joins 
EU.  Reduction 
of government 
intervention, 
deregulation 
and 
implementation 
of EU 
directives. 
 Harmonisation 
with EU, 
increased 
privatisation of 
banks and 
curtail of 
regulatory 
hedges. 
 Full 
modernisation of 
financial services 
and creation of 
bank-insurance 
structures. 
 
 
Examining the US financial services industry, Kane (1996) notes that 
before an exclusionary statute comes to be formally rescinded, most of the effects 
targeted by the rescission will have already been tolerated by the enforcement 
system for years.  That is, when structural changes in a regulated market trigger a 
reaction, the sequence becomes one of innovation, re-regulation and avoidance.  
The first stage mirrors the conflict between creativity and established regulatory 
boundaries, while the subsequent stages in the sequence could be easily 
interpreted as the first stage of a new sequence.  Using US cases, academics have 
examined such behaviour [Kane (1988), Carow & Heron (2002), Carow & Kane 
(2002)] by financial intermediaries, where the phenomenon is labelled as 
“loophole mining”.  Taken all together, it is evident that the Greek bank-insurance 
phenomenon is not as new as one would expect, but existed for many years 
waiting to be incited by the forces of open market economy and financial 
engineering. 
 
IV.   Concluding Remarks 
 
 The current study delves into the bank-insurance trend in the Greek 
market.  The research is mainly motivated by the notable economic reform of the 
Greek state, its strategic location and financially advanced position in Southern 
Europe; as well as the theoretical advantages of the bank-insurance in various 
aspects of the corporate spectrum, its upsurge in many EU/emerging markets and 
its implications for the financial system. 
 The findings suggest that insurers are using the banks’ clientele to increase 
their market share though strategic alliances with both domestic and foreign firms.  
Recently, more committed forms of collaboration surface in the form of joint 
ventures with the involvement of multinational giants.  The most popular 
approach to make inroads into the insurance sector is the traditional subsidiary 
model, which its operation can be traced in Greece for over a century.  Apart from 
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these individual strategies, financial institutions seem to pursue collaborations 
with more than one business partner by engaging in multi-venture activities.  
Furthermore, operational and distribution channels might not be clearly defined 
and market participants seem to experiment and learn both from their own as well 
as their competitors’ process.  The current regulatory framework helps that 
“loose” structure, which for the time being introduces an element of flexibility in 
the collaboration of bankers and insurers.  The market should start, however, 
taking decision regarding boundaries of future partnerships and collaborations. 
Such interface conduits have transformed the financial arena and the 
questions that emanate are certainly known.  Where are they heading to?  How are 
they going to achieve their goals?  Although insurers may have started providing 
pure outsourcing services, the market picture is constantly changing in the new 
millennium.  Both sectors move closer to each other and share their experiences 
and expertise.  Banks and insurers will be sharing asset management and 
underwriting activities in the near future.  Thus, a combination of distribution 
channels will be formed using both bank and insurance-based structures.  The 
insurer will stop being purely the risk carrier and it may re-emerge as the risk 
engineer.  The demand for more integrated services leads to bundling and 
unbundling financial products, which in turn could be provided more efficiently 
through the interface of the industries involved (Saunders, 1994). 
One of the early studies on bank holding companies regulation (Black, 
Miller & Posner, 1978) raises the issue of risk proliferation, as well as the social 
cost of dealing with it.  Do exclusionary regulations actually impose any financial 
and/or social costs on taxpayers?  Do they generate ostensible social benefits such 
as financial stability and improved credit flow?  Last but not least, it is obvious 
that the phenomenon is not as simple as empirical and quantitative research might 
possibly portrait.  It would be valuable to pursue further research, beyond 
statistical analysis, covering a wide spectrum of activities ranging from risk 
related and financial to management to strategy and reputation areas. 
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